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Abstract
The endowment effect has been widely documented. Recent models of
reference-dependent preferences indicate that expectations play a prominent role
in the presence of the phenomenon. A subset of such expectations-based models
predicts an endowment effect for risk when reference points change from certain
to stochastic. In two purposefully simple risk preference experiments, eliminat-
ing often-discussed confounds, I demonstrate both between and within-subjects
an endowment effect for risky gambles. While subjects are virtually risk neutral
when choosing between fixed gambles and changing certain amounts, a high de-
gree of risk aversion is displayed when choosing between fixed amounts and chang-
ing gambles. These results provide needed separation between expectations-
based reference-dependent models, allow for evaluation of recent theoretical ex-
tensions, and may help to close a long-standing debate in decision science on
inconsistency between probability and certainty equivalent methodology for util-
ity elicitation.
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1 Introduction
The endowment effect refers to the frequent finding in both experimental and survey
research that willingness to pay (WTP) for a given object is generally lower than
willingness to accept (WTA) for the same good.1 Though standard economics argues
the two values should be equal apart from income effects, differences between WTA
and WTP have been documented across a variety of contexts from public services
and environmental protection to private goods and hunting licences (Thaler, 1980;
Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Coursey, Hovis and Schulze,
1987; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Harbaugh, Krause and
Vesterlund, 2001). Horowitz and McConnell (2002) provide a survey of 50 studies and
find a median ratio of mean WTA to mean WTP of 2.6.
The endowment effect has been cited as a key example of loss aversion relative to
a reference point (Knetsch, Tang and Thaler, 2001). Reference-dependent preferences
with disproportionate treatment of losses predicts sizable differences between WTA
and WTP. If losses are felt more severely than commensurate gains, paying for a
good one does not own involves incurring monetary loss, reducing WTP. Meanwhile,
giving up a good one does own involves incurring physical loss, increasing WTA. The
preference structure of loss aversion drives a wedge between the two values, resulting
in WTA > WTP.
Theoretical models of reference-dependent preferences with asymmetric treatment
of losses originated in the prospect theory work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
These models have gained traction, rationalizing not only the endowment effect, but
also a number of other important anomalies from labor market decisions (Camerer,
Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler, 1997; Goette and Fehr, 2007), to consumer behavior
(Hardie, Johnson and Fader, 1993; Sydnor, Forthcoming), and finance (Odean, 1998;
Barberis and Huang, 2001; Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001), among others.
Critical to reference-dependent models is the determination of the reference point
around which losses and gains are encoded. Originally, the reference point was left
undetermined, taken to be the status quo, current level of assets, or a level of aspiration
or expectation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Indeed, the freedom of the reference
point may be the reason why reference dependence is able to rationalize such a large
amount of behavior. Model extensions have added discipline. Particular attention has
been given to expectations-based mechanisms for the determination of fixed reference
points in models of Disappointment Aversion (DA) (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden,
1Though I will refer to WTP and WTA as exchanging money for goods, these terms can also be
thought of as willingness to exchange goods for goods such as mugs for pens and vice versa.
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1986; Gul, 1991), or for the determination of stochastic reference distributions in the
more recent models of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) (KR).2 In DA the referent is
modeled as the expected utility certainty equivalent of a gamble, while in the KR model
the referent is the full distribution of expected outcomes.
The DA and KR models provide coherent structure for the determination of refer-
ence points, and have found support in a number of studies. A recent body of field
and laboratory evidence has highlighted the importance of expectations for reference-
dependent behavior (Post, van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler, 2008; Ericson and
Fuster, 2009; Gill and Prowse, 2010; Pope and Schweitzer, Forthcoming; Crawford and
Meng, Forthcoming; Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman, Forthcoming; Card and Dahl,
Forthcoming). Additionally, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and Knetsch and Wong (2009)
argue that a sensible account of expectations may help to organize the discussion of
the conditions under which the endowment effect is observed in standard exchange
experiments (Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007).3
Though the accumulated data do demonstrate the importance of expectations for
reference dependence, the data is generally consistent with either DA or the KR model
and is often presented as such. That is, the body of evidence is unable to distinguish
between the DA and KR models. Achieving such a distinction is critical for evaluating
applications of the two models in a variety of settings where their predictions dif-
fer. Such settings include, but are not limited to theoretical extensions, experimental
anomalies, financial decision making and marketing.
This paper presents evidence from two experiments focused on identifying a par-
ticular prediction of the KR model which is not shared with disappointment aversion:
an endowment effect for risk. The KR model predicts that when risk is expected, and
therefore the referent is stochastic, behavior will be different from when risk is unex-
pected and the referent is certain. In particular, when the referent is stochastic, and
an individual is offered a certain amount, the KR model predicts near risk neutrality.
Conversely, when the referent is a fixed certain amount, and an individual is offered a
2Disappointment Aversion can refer to a number of different classes of models. I focus primarily on
Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) who capture disappointment aversion in functional form
by fixing the referent as the certainty equivalent of a given gamble and develop a reference-dependent
disappointment-elation function around this point. Shalev (2000) provides a similar functional form in
a loss-averse game-theoretic context with the reference point fixed at a gamble’s certainty equivalent.
Though similar in spirit to these models, Gul (1991) provides a distinct axiomatic foundation for
disappointment aversion relaxing the independence axiom. The resulting representation’s functional
form is similar to prospect theory probability weighting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992) with disappointment aversion making a particular global restriction on the shape
of the probability weighting function (Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt, 2007).
3Expectations of exchange may also help organize results such as documented differences in
endowment-effect behavior between experienced traders and novices List (2003, 2004).
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gamble, the KR model predicts risk aversion. Hence, the KR model features an endow-
ment effect for risk. Disappointment aversion makes no such asymmetric prediction as
to the relationship between risk attitudes and reference points, because gambles are
always evaluated relative to a fixed referent, the gamble’s certainty equivalent.4
Prior studies have provided only limited evidence on the critical KR prediction of
an endowment effect for risk. Knetsch and Sinden (1984) demonstrate that a higher
proportion of individuals are willing to pay $2 to keep a lottery ticket with unknown
odds of winning around $50, than to accept $2 to give up the same lottery ticket if
they already possess it. Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) show that WTA for a 50%-
50% gamble over $20 is significantly larger than subsequent WTP out of experimental
earnings for the same gamble.
Though intriguing, these studies and others on the endowment effect suffer from
potential experimental confounds. Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) discuss a variety of
issues. In particular, they argue that when providing subjects with actual endowments
via language, visual cues or physical cues, subjects may view the endowment as a
gift and be unwilling to part with it. When using neutral language and elicitation
procedures based on the Becker, Degroot and Marschak (1964) mechanism, Plott and
Zeiler (2005) document virtually no difference between WTA and WTP for university-
branded mugs.5 Plott and Zeiler (2007) demonstrate, among other things, the extent
to which the endowment effect could be related to subjects’ interpretation of gift-
giving. The authors increase and reduce emphasis on gifts and document corresponding
increases and decreases in willingness to trade endowed mugs for pens, and vice versa.
Given the potential confounds of prior experimental methods, it is important to
move away from the domain of physical endowments and ownership-related language. I
present between and within-subjects results from simple, neutrally-worded experiments
conducted with undergraduate students at the University of California, San Diego. In
the primary experiment, 136 subjects were separated into two groups. Half of subjects
were asked a series of certainty equivalents for given gambles. In each decision the
gamble was fixed while the certain amount was changed. The other half were asked a
series of probability equivalents for given certain amounts. In each decision the certain
amount was fixed while the gamble probabilities were changed. In a second study,
4See Koszegi and Rabin (2007) for discussion.
5Plott and Zeiler (2005) discuss data from a series of small-scale paid practice lottery conditions,
which they argue were contaminated by subject misunderstanding and order effects. Recently these
data have been called into question as potentially demonstrating an endowment effect for small-stakes
lotteries (Isoni, Loomes and Sugden, Forthcoming). However, the debate remains unresolved as to
whether subject misunderstanding of the Becker et al. (1964) mechanism or other aspects of the
experimental procedure are the primary factors (Plott and Zeiler, Forthcoming).
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portions of the data collected for Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) with an additional 76
subjects and a similar, within-subjects design are presented.
The results are striking. Both between and within-subjects virtual risk neutrality
is obtained in the certainty equivalents data, while significant risk aversion is obtained
in probability equivalents. In the primary study, subjects randomly assigned to prob-
ability equivalent conditions are between three and four times more likely to exhibit
risk aversion than subjects assigned to certainty equivalent conditions. This result is
maintained when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, numeracy, cognitive
ability and self-reported risk attitudes.
The between-subjects design of the primary study is complemented with additional
uncertainty equivalents (McCord and de Neufville, 1986; Magat, Viscusi and Huber,
1996; Oliver, 2005, 2007; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2010). Uncertainty equivalents ask
subjects to choose between a given gamble and alternate gambles outside of the given
gamble’s outcome support. The KR preference model predicts risk aversion in this
domain and risk neutrality in the inverse. That is, individuals should be risk averse
when endowed with a gamble (p; y, x), y > x > 0 and trading for gambles (q; y, 0), but
should be risk neutral when endowed with a gamble (p; y, 0) and trading for gambles
(q; y, x).6 These predictions are generally supported.
Finding evidence of an endowment effect for risk, particularly in a neutral envi-
ronment like that presented in these studies, provides support for the KR preference
model. Unlike prior work demonstrating the importance of expectations for refer-
ence points, these results are able to distinguish between KR preferences and other
expectations-based models such as disappointment aversion. Gaining separation be-
tween these models is an important experimental step and necessary for evaluating
theoretical developments that depend critically on the stochasticity of the referent
(Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007; Heidhues and Koszegi, 2008; Koszegi and Rabin,
2009). Additionally, the distinction between the KR and DA models is important
in a variety of applied settings where the two models make different predictions. In
particular, the DA model predicts first order risk aversion in the sense of Segal and
Spivak (1990) over all gambles, while the KR model predicts first order risk aversion
only when risk is unexpected.7 Applications include financial decisions where first
order risk aversion is argued to influence stock market participation (Haliassos and
Bertaut, 1995; Barberis, Huang and Thaler, 2006) and returns (Epstein and Zin, 1990;
6Standard theories and disappointment aversion again predict no difference in risk preference across
this changing experimental environment.
7By unexpected I mean when risky outcomes lie outside the support of the referent. This is the
case when the referent is fixed and when the referent is stochastic but outcomes are more variable.
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Barberis and Huang, 2001); insurance purchasing where first order risk aversion po-
tentially influences contract choice (Sydnor, Forthcoming), and decision science where
researchers have long debated the inconsistency between probability equivalent and
certainty equivalent methods for utility assessment (Hershey, Kunreuther and Schoe-
maker, 1982; McCord and de Neufville, 1985, 1986; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985;
Schoemaker, 1990).
In addition to providing techniques for modeling stochastic referents, Koszegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) propose a refinement of their model, the Preferred Personal Equilib-
rium (PPE), in which the referent is revealed by choice behavior. The PPE refinement
predicts identical risk attitudes across the experimental conditions. Since the findings
reject disappointment aversion, which predicts the same pattern, it necessarily rejects
this refinement. A more likely non-PPE candidate for organizing the behavior is that
the referent is established as the fixed element in a given series of decisions, which was
always presented first. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) provide intuition in this direction
suggesting “a person’s reference point is her probabilistic beliefs about the relevant
consumption outcome held between the time she first focused on the decision deter-
mining the outcome and shortly before consumption occurs”[p. 1141]. “First focus”
may plausibly be drawn to the fixed, first element in a series of decisions and the in-
tuition is in line with both the psychological literature on “cognitive reference points”
(Rosch, 1974)8 and evidence from multi-person domains where behavior is organized
around initial reactions to experimental environments (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004;
Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007; Costa-Gomes, Craw-
ford and Iriberri, 2009). The potential sensitivity of expectations-based referents to
minor contextual changes has implications for both economic agents, such as marketers,
and experimental methodology.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents conceptual considerations for
thinking about certainty and probability equivalents in standard theories, reference-
dependent theories and the KR model. Section 3 presents experimental design and
Section 4 presents results. Section 5 provides interpretation and discusses future av-
enues of research and Section 6 is a conclusion.
8Rosch (1974) describes a cognitive reference point as the stimulus “which other stimuli are seen
‘in relation to’”[p. 532]. In the present studies this relationship is achieved by asking subjects to make
repeated choices between the fixed decision element and changing alternatives.
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2 Conceptual Considerations
In this section several models of risk preferences are discussed. With one exception, the
models predict equivalence of risk attitudes across certainty equivalents and probability
equivalents. The exception is the KR model, which predicts an endowment effect for
risk.
Consider expected utility. Any complete, transitive, continuous preference order-
ing over lotteries that also satisfies the independence axiom will be represented by a
standard expected utility function, v(·), that is linear in probabilities. Under such
preferences, a certainty equivalent for a given gamble will be established by a simple
indifference condition. Take a binary p gamble over two positive values, y and x ≤ y,
(p; y, x), and some certain amount, c, satisfying the indifference condition
v(c) = p · v(y) + (1− p) · v(x).
Under expected utility, it will not matter whether risk preferences are elicited via the
certainty equivalent, c, or the probability equivalent, p; the elicited level of risk aversion,
or the curvature of v(·), should be identical. There should be no endowment effect for
risk.
A similar argument can be made for reference-dependent prospect theory which
establishes loss-averse utility levels relative to some fixed referent and relaxes the in-
dependence axiom’s implied linearity in probability (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Pr-
elec, 1998; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000).
Let u(·|r) represent loss-averse utility given some fixed referent, r. The cumulative
prospect theory indifference condition is
u(c|r) = π(p) · u(y|r) + (1− π(p)) · u(x|r),
where π(·) represents some arbitrary non-linear probability weighting function. Under
such a utility formulation, certainty and probability equivalents again yield identical
risk attitudes as the reference point is fixed at some known value.
Extensions to reference-dependent preferences have attempted to explain behavior
by establishing what the reference point should actually be. Models of disappointment
aversion fix the prospect theory reference point via expectations as a gamble’s expected
utility certainty equivalent (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986). Disappointment
aversion’s fixed referent does not change the predicted equivalence of risk preferences
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across probability and certainty equivalents as gambles are always evaluated relative
to their certainty equivalents. In effect, disappointment aversion selects r in the above
indifference condition as the expected utility certainty equivalent, p·v(y)+(1−p)·v(x),
and selects a linear probability weighting function.9
2.1 KR Preferences
The KR model builds upon standard reference-dependent preferences in two important
ways. First, similar to disappointment aversion, the referent is expectations-based, and
second, the referent may be stochastic. Together these innovations imply that behavior
when risk is expected, and therefore the referent is stochastic, will be substantially
different from when risk is unexpected, and the referent is certain. In particular, KR
preferences as presented below predict risk neutrality in specific cases where the referent
is stochastic and risk aversion in cases where the the referent is certain.
Let r represent the referent potentially drawn according to measure G. Let x be a
consumption outcome potentially drawn according to measure F . Then the KR utility
formulation is
U(F |G) =
∫∫
u(x|r)dG(r)dF (x)
with
u(x|r) = m(x) + µ(m(x)−m(r)).
The function m(·) represents consumption utility and µ(·) represents gain-loss utility
relative to the referent, r. Several simplifying assumptions are made. First, following
Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) small stakes decisions are considered such that con-
sumption utility, m(·), can plausibly be taken as approximately linear, and a piecewise-
linear gain-loss utility function is adopted,
µ(y) =
{
η · y if y ≥ 0
η · λ · y if y < 0
}
,
where the utility parameter λ represents the degree of loss aversion. For simplicity and
to aid the exposition, η = 1 is assumed, and only binary lotteries are considered such
that G and F will be binomial distributions summarized by probability values p and
q, respectively.
Consider two cases, first where the referent is certain and consumption outcomes
are stochastic, and second where the referent is stochastic and consumption outcomes
9See Bell (1985); Loomes and Sugden (1986) for the exact functional forms.
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are certain. The above KR model predicts risk averse behavior in the first case and
risk neutrality in the second. This is illustrated next.
2.1.1 Probability Equivalent: Certain Referent, Binary Consumption
Gamble
Consider a referent, r, and a binary consumption gamble with outcomes x1 ≥ r with
probability q and x2 ≤ r with probability 1− q.10 Write the KR utility as
U(F |r) = q · u(x1|r) + (1− q) · u(x2|r).
The first term refers to the chance of expecting r as the referent and obtaining x1 as
the consumption outcome. The second term is similar for expecting r and obtaining
x2. If x1 ≥ r > x2, the KR model predicts loss aversion to be present in the second
term. Under the assumptions above, this becomes
U(F |r) = q · [x1 + 1 · (x1 − r)] + (1− q) · [x2 + λ · (x2 − r)]. (1)
Compare this to the utility of the certain amount, U(r|r) = r. The lottery will be
preferred to the certain referent if U(F |r) > U(r|r) and the indifference point, or
probability equivalent, will be obtained for some F ∗, with corresponding probability q∗,
such that U(F ∗|r) = U(r|r),
r = q∗ · [x1 + 1 · (x1 − r)] + (1− q∗) · [x2 + λ · (x2 − r)];
q∗ =
r − x2 − λ · (x2 − r)
[x1 − x2] + [1 · (x1 − r)− λ · (x2 − r)]
. (2)
The interpretation of the relationship between risk aversion elicited as q∗ and loss
aversion, λ, is straightforward. For an individual who is not loss averse, λ = 1, q∗ =
(r − x2)/(x1 − x2). This equates the expected value of the probability equivalent and
the referent value, r = q∗ · x1 + (1 − q∗) · x2. Risk neutral behavior is exhibited by
individuals who are not loss averse.
For loss averse individuals with λ > 1, q∗ > (r−x2)/(x1−x2) for x1 > r > x2 ≥ 0.
The gamble F ∗ will have higher expected value than r. Figure 1, Panel A illustrates
10I assume x2 ≥ 0 and that at least one of the inequalities is strict such that consumption gamble
is non-degenerate.
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the decision for a loss averse individual. Additionally dq∗/dλ > 0 for x1 > r > x2 ≥ 0,
such that probability equivalents are increasing in the degree of loss aversion.11 If
endowed with a fixed amount in a probability equivalent task and trading for a gamble,
a loss-averse individual will appear risk averse.
Note that as x1 approaches r, then q
∗ approaches 1, and as x2 approaches r, then
q∗ approaches 0. Hence q∗ will accord with the risk neutral level, (r−x2)/(x1−x2), at
the limits x1 = r and x2 = r. This implies a hump shaped deviation between q
∗ and
the risk neutral level of q if λ > 1.
2.1.2 Certainty Equivalent: Binary Referent Gamble, Certain Consump-
tion
Now consider a binary referent gamble and the prospect of certain consumption. Let
r1 be the referent with probability p and r2 ≤ r1 be the referent with probability 1− p.
The utility of the binary referent gamble is
U(G|G) = p·p·u(r1|r1)+(1−p)·(1−p)·u(r2|r2)+p·(1−p)·u(r1|r2)+p·(1−p)·u(r2|r1).
The first term refers to the chance of expecting r1 as the referent and obtaining r1 as the
consumption outcome. The second term is similar for r2. The third term refers to the
chance of expecting r2 as the referent and obtaining r1 as the consumption outcome.
The fourth term refers to the chance of expecting r1 as the referent and obtaining r2
as the consumption outcome. With r1 ≥ r2, the KR model predicts loss aversion to be
present in the fourth term. Under the assumed utility formulation this reduces to
U(G|G) = p2 ·r1 +(1−p)2 ·r2 +p ·(1−p) · [r1 +1 ·(r1−r2)]+p ·(1−p) · [r2 +λ ·(r2−r1)];
U(G|G) = p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 + p · (1− p) · [1 · (r1 − r2) + λ · (r2 − r1)].
Given this stochastic referent, consider the utility of a certain outcome, x, with r1 ≥
x ≥ r2,
U(x|G) = p · u(x|r1) + (1− p) · u(x|r2),
U(x|G) = x+ p · [λ · (x− r1)] + (1− p) · [1 · (x− r2)].
The indifference point, or certainty equivalent c, is obtained for U(c|G) = u(G|G),
p·r1+(1−p)·r2+p·(1−p)·[1·(r1−r2)+λ·(r2−r1)] = c+p·[λ·(c−r1)]+(1−p)·[1·(c−r2)].
11The derivative dq∗/dλ = −(x2−r)·(2x1−2r)[x1−x2+1·(x1−r)−λ·(x2−r)]2 > 0 for x1 > r > x2 ≥ 0.
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To demonstrate that individuals will be risk neutral in certainty equivalent de-
cisions, one need only establish the expected value as the risk neutral benchmark,
c = p · r1 + (1− p) · r2. Substituting c = c in the right hand side of the above equation,
one obtains
p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 + p · [λ(p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 − r1)] + (1− p) · [1(p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 − r2)],
which reduces to
p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 + p · (1− p) · [1(r1 − r2) + λ(r2 − r1)],
and is identical to the left hand side of the above equation. Hence, indifference occurs
at the risk neutral benchmark, c = c = p · r1 + (1− p) · r2. Figure 1, Panel B illustrates
the certainty equivalent of a gamble as the gamble’s expected value, c. If endowed with
a gamble in a certainty equivalent task and trading for a fixed amount, a loss-averse
individual will appear risk neutral, regardless of the level of loss aversion. This is in
contrast to probability equivalents where loss-averse individuals will appear risk averse.
2.1.3 Equilibrium Behavior
Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) present a rational expectations equilibrium concept,
the Unacclimating Personal Equilibrium (UPE), in which consumption outcomes cor-
respond to expectations. The objective of the UPE concept is to represent the notion
that rational individuals will only expect consumption outcomes that they will defi-
nitely consume given the expectation of said consumption outcomes. To select among
the potential multiplicity of such equilibria, the KR model features a refinement, the
Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE). The PPE concept maintains that the UPE with
the highest ex-ante expected utility is selected.12
The development above demonstrates that KR preferences may allow for a differ-
ence in elicited risk behavior between certainty equivalents and probability equiva-
lents. However, this difference is not predicted under PPE. The probability equivalent,
U(F ∗|r), and the certainty equivalent, U(c|G), are not UPE values as the referent and
consumption outcomes do not coincide.
If the referent is revealed in choice behavior, then when an individual is observed ac-
12Another equilibrium concept in Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) is the Choice-acclimating Personal
Equilibrium (CPE) which applies to decisions made far in advance of the resolution of uncertainty. In
the present context CPE and PPE have similar implications, as both are based on the coincidence of
referent and consumption outcomes.
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cepting some gamble, F ∗, over some fixed amount, r, the PPE concept establishes only
that U(F ∗|F ∗) > U(r|r). That is, (F ∗|F ∗) provided the higher ex-ante expected utility.
If U(F ∗|F ∗) > U(r|r) is the PPE revealed preference in a probability equivalent, then
it cannot be that the opposite is revealed in a certainty equivalent. Under PPE, the
KR model predicts no difference between certainty equivalents and probability equiv-
alents. However, equilibrium behavior may be a challenging requirement. Individuals
may naively change their referent in accordance with changes in contextual variables.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) provide intuitive support for such naivete suggesting that the
referent is established as the probabilistic beliefs held at the moment of “first focus” on
a decision. To the extent that first focus is drawn to different aspects of decisions, one
might expect very similar decisions in theory to induce different probabilistic referents
in practice. The experimental design is indeed predicated on the notion that minor
changes in experimental context, particularly what element is fixed and presented first
in a decision environment, can effectively change the perceived referent.
3 Experimental Design
Motivated by the conceptual development above, a primary between-subjects two con-
dition experiment was designed. A secondary within-subjects design with similar meth-
ods and data from Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) is discussed in Section 4.3. In Condi-
tion 1, subjects completed two series of probability equivalents tasks. The tasks were
designed in price-list style with 21 decision rows in each task. Each decision row was
a choice between ‘Option A’, a certain amount, and ‘Option B’, an uncertain gamble.
The certain Option A was fixed for each task, as were the gamble outcomes. The prob-
ability of receiving the gamble’s good outcome increased from 0% to 100% as subjects
proceeded through the task. In Condition 1.1, subjects completed 8 tasks with fixed
certain amounts chosen from {$6, $8, $10, $14, $17, $20, $23, $26} and gambles over $30
and $0. In Condition 1.2, subjects completed 6 tasks with fixed certain amounts cho-
sen from {$12, $14, $17, $20, $23, $26} and gambles over $30 and $10. Most subjects
began each task by preferring Option A and then switched to Option B such that the
probability at which a subject switches from Option A to Option B provides bounds for
their probability equivalent. Figure 2, Panel A features a sample probability equivalent
task. If the fixed Option A element in each task is perceived as the referent, the KR
model predicts risk aversion in these probability equivalents.
In Condition 2, subjects completed two series of certainty equivalents tasks. The
tasks were similarly designed in price-list style with 22 decision rows in each task. Each
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decision row was a choice between ‘Option A’, a gamble, and ‘Option B’, a cer-
tain amount. The Option A gamble was fixed for each task. The certain amount
increased as subjects proceeded down the task. In Condition 2.1, subjects com-
pleted 7 tasks with gamble outcomes of $30 and $0, probabilities chosen from
{0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95}, and certain amounts ranging from $0 to $30.
In Condition 2.2 subjects completed a further 7 tasks with gamble outcomes of $30
and $10, probabilities chosen from {0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95}, and certain
amounts ranging from $10 to $30. Most subjects began each task by preferring Op-
tion A and then switched to Option B such that the certain value at which a subject
switched from Option A to Option B provides bounds for their certainty equivalent.
Figure 2, Panel B features a sample certainty equivalent task. If the fixed Option A
element in each task is perceived as the referent, the KR model predicts risk neutrality
in these certainty equivalents.
3.1 Additional Measures
The probability and certainty equivalents tasks of Conditions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1 and
2.2 provide a simple comparison of elicited risk attitudes. This design is comple-
mented with a third set of tasks for which the KR model can also predict ex-
perimental differences. Condition 1.3, completed by subjects assigned to Condi-
tion 1, was a series of 8 uncertainty equivalent tasks with 21 decision rows in each
task. Option A was a fixed gamble over $30 and $10 with probabilities chosen
from {0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95}. Option B was a changing gamble
over $30 and $0. Condition 2.3, completed by subjects assigned to Condition 2,
was a series of inverted uncertainty equivalent tasks with 21 decision rows in each
task. Option A was a fixed gamble over $30 and $0 with probabilities chosen from
{0.35, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.75, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95}. Option B was a changing gamble over $30
and $10. Figure 3, Panels A and B provide a sample uncertainty equivalent and the
inverse.
The KR preference model can predict a marked difference in elicited risk attitudes
across Conditions 1.3 and 2.3 if the referent is perceived as the fixed element in each
task. The KR model predicts a particular shape of quadratically declining risk aversion
in Condition 1.3, the standard uncertainty equivalent. The reason is that at the lowest
probability, 0, the task is identical to a probability equivalent of $10 for sure. As
discussed in Section 2.1.1, risk aversion is predicted. From there, both the referent and
the outcomes are stochastic such that the uncertainty equivalent (q; 30, 0) for a given
gamble (p; 30, 10) will be a convex function of p related to the squared probability, p2.
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The deviation from linearity depends on the degree of loss aversion λ and Appendix
Section A.1 provides the mathematical detail. This is in contrast to the prediction
of expected utility where q should be a linear function p. This is also in contrast
to cumulative prospect theory probability weighting (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
where q is predicted to be a concave function of p.13
Interestingly, the KR model predicts risk neutrality in Condition 2.3, the inverted
uncertainty equivalent. The logic is as follows: having prospective gamble outcomes
inside of the support of the referent gamble is similar to having a perturbed certainty
equivalent task. Just as risk neutrality is predicted in certainty equivalents, the KR
model also predicts risk neutrality in the inverted uncertainty equivalents. Appendix
Section A.1 again provides the mathematical detail.
3.2 Design Details
In order to eliminate often-discussed confounds (Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2007), neutral
language such as ‘Option A’ and ‘Option B’ was used throughout. Subjects were never
told that they were trading nor was exchange ever mentioned in the instructions.
Subjects were told,
In each task you are asked to make a series of decisions between two options:
Option A and Option B. In each task Option A will be fixed while Option B will vary.
For example, ... [EXAMPLE].... For each row all you have to do is decide whether
you prefer Option A or Option B.
The full instructions are provided as Appendix Section A.3. In each condition, the
decisions were blocked into tasks corresponding to the three sub-conditions discussed
above. New instructions were read at the beginning of each task block explaining the
new procedures and encouraging subjects to take each decision carefully. Subjects were
provided with calculators should they wish to use them in making their decisions.
Two orders of the tasks were used in each condition to examine order effects: X.1,
X.3, X.2 and X.2, X.3, X.1. The uncertainty equivalents were left in the middle as
a buffer between the more similar tasks. No order effects were observed. In addition
to varying the order, an attempt was also made to manipulate slightly the physical
representation of Option A in each decision. This was done for around half of subjects
by stapling miniature copies of the appropriate number of bills, or bills with appropriate
13See Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) for a discussion of uncertainty equivalents and their value in
separating between competing models of risk preferences.
16
percentages at the top of each decision sheet. The stapling was done such that subjects
would be forced to hold the representation of Option A in order to make the first few
decisions. Though I imagined that this nuance might influence the degree of attachment
to Option A, it had virtually no effect.14 A total of 136 subjects participated in the
study across 10 experimental sessions. Table 1 provides the dates, times, orders and
details of all sessions.
Table 1: Experimental Sessions
Number Date Time Condition Order Representation # Obs
1 May 11, 2010 12:00 pm 1 (1) X.1, X.3, X.2 No 10
2 May 11, 2010 2:30 pm 1 (2) X.2, X.3, X.1 No 12
3 May 12, 2010 12:00 pm 2 (1) X.1, X.3, X.2 No 19
4 May 12, 2010 2:30 pm 2 (2) X.2, X.3, X.1 No 16
5 May 18, 2010 12:00 pm 1 (1) X.1, X.3, X.2 No 11
6 May 18, 2010 2:30 pm 1 (2) X.2, X.3, X.1 No 6
7 May 25, 2010 12:00 pm 1 (1) X.1, X.3, X.2 Yes 15
8 May 25, 2010 2:30 pm 1 (2) X.2, X.3, X.1 Yes 16
9 May 26, 2010 12:00 pm 2 (1) X.1, X.3, X.2 Yes 15
10 May 26, 2010 2:30 pm 2 (2) X.2, X.3, X.1 Yes 16
Total 136
Notes: ‘Representation’ refers to whether or not Option A was physically represented by stapling
miniature bills or bills and percentages to the decision sheet.
In order to provide incentive for truthful revelation of preferences, subjects were
randomly paid for one of their choices.15 The instructions fully described the payment
procedure and the mechanism for carrying out randomization of payments, two ten-
sided die. The randomization was described in independent terms. That is, mention
was made of rolling die first for Option A and then for Option B and an example
was given. Subjects earned, on average, $23 from the study including a $5 minimum
payment that was added to all experimental earnings.
14Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) use uncertainty equivalents to test expected utility and investigate
violations of first order stochastic dominance near to certainty. In the non-representation treatments
for Condition 1.3 the findings are reproduced. However, in the representation treatments for Condition
1.3, stochastic dominance violations at certainty are reduced to zero. See Sections 4.2 and 4.3 for
discussion.
15This randomization device introduces a compound lottery to the decision environment as each
individual made around 440 choices over their 22 tasks. Reduction of compound lotteries does not
change the general equivalence predictions for standard expected utility, prospect theory and dis-
appointment aversion discussed above. However, to the extent that the compound lottery changes
perceived referents, the randomization introduces complications into the KR analysis as it creates a
potential link between choices and referents across tasks. See Section 4.1 for further discussion.
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4 Results
The results are presented in three sub-sections. The first sub-section provides a brief
summary of the elicited risk attitudes across the two conditions and non-parametric
tests demonstrating risk aversion in the probability equivalent tasks and virtual risk
neutrality in the certainty equivalent tasks. Second, motivated by these non-parametric
results, the KR utility model is estimated and compelling out-of-sample predictions for
uncertainty equivalent tasks at both the aggregate and individual level are provided.
The third sub-section is devoted to discussing within-subjects results with data from
Andreoni and Sprenger (2010), which also demonstrate significant differences in elicited
risk preferences between certainty and probability equivalent techniques.
4.1 Risk Attitudes
Of the 136 individuals who participated in the primary experiment, 70 individuals
participated in Condition 1 and 66 participated in Condition 2. As in most price-list
style experiments, a number of subjects switch from Option A to Option B and then
back to Option A.16 Three subjects (4.3%) in Condition 1 and eleven subjects (16.7%)
in Condition 2 featured multiple switch points in at least one task. The majority
of multiple switching occurred in Condition 2.3, indicating that this task may have
been confusing to subjects.17 Attention is given to the 122 subjects who had unique
switch points in all 22 decision tasks.18 This results in 1474 individual decisions in
Condition 1 and 1210 decisions in Condition 2. Of these 2684 total decision tasks,
in a small percentage (0.60%) the subject preferred Option A for all rows and in a
larger percentage (4.14%) the subject preferred Option B for all rows. These responses
provide only one-sided bounds on the interval of the subject’s response. The other
bound is imputed via top and bottom-coding accordingly.19
16Around 10 percent of subjects feature multiple switch points in similar price-list experiments (Holt
and Laury, 2002; Meier and Sprenger, 2010), and as many as 50 percent in some cases (Jacobson and
Petrie, 2009). Because such multiple switch points are difficult to rationalize and may indicate subject
confusion, researchers often exclude such observations or mechanically enforce single switch points.
See Harrison, Lau, Rutstrom and Williams (2005) for discussion.
17Five of 11 multiple switchers in Condition 2, had multiple switching in only Condition 2.3, one
had multiple switching in Conditions 2.1 and 2.3, two had multiple switching in Conditions 2.2 and
2.3, and three had multiple switching in all three subconditions.
18All results are maintained when including multiple switchers and taking their first switch point
as their choice. See Appendix Table A1 for details.
19For example if an individual chose Option A at all rows in a probability equivalent including when
Option B was a 100% chance of getting $30, I topcode the interval as [100, 100]. Virtually all of the
bottom-coded responses, 100 of 111, were decisions in Condition 2.3 where the bottom-coded choice
would be preferring $10 with certainty to a given gamble over $0 and $30. No bottom-coded responses
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A variety of demographic, cognitive and attitudinal data were collected after the
study was concluded in order to provide a simple balancing test. Table 2 compares
data across experimental conditions for survey respondents.20 Though some differences
do exist, particularly in academic year, subjects were broadly balanced on observable
characteristics, simple numeracy and cognitive ability scores, and subjectively reported
risk attitudes.21 An omnibus test from the logit regression of condition assignment on
all survey variables for 111 of 122 individuals with complete survey data does not
reject the null hypothesis of equal demographic, cognitive and attitudinal character-
istics across conditions (χ2 = 14.1, p = 0.12). Because the randomization is at the
session level, this helps to ensure that accidental selection issues are not driving the
experimental results. Additional within-subjects results unaffected by selection are
provided in Sub-Section 4.3, along with demonstrations of robustness to controlling for
demographic differences.
I begin by investigating behavior in Conditions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1 and 2.2. With the excep-
tion of the KR preference model, all discussed theories predict experimental equivalence
across these conditions. That is, elicited risk attitudes should be identical whether one
asks the probability equivalent of a given certain amount or the certainty equivalent
of a given gamble. Figure 4 presents median data for the 122 individuals with unique
switch points along with a dashed black line corresponding to risk neutrality. The ex-
perimentally controlled parameter is presented on the horizontal axis and the median
subject response is presented on the vertical axis.
Apparent from the median data is the systematic difference in elicited risk attitudes
between certainty and probability equivalents. When fixing a stochastic gamble and
trading for increasing certain amounts in Conditions 2.1 and 2.2, subjects display
virtual risk neutrality. When fixing a certain amount and trading for increasing gambles
in Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 subjects display risk aversion.
For each experimental task, decisions are classified as being risk neutral, risk averse
or risk loving. These classifications recognize the interval nature of the data. For
arose in Condition 1 or 2.1 where the lowest Option B outcome was $0 with certainty.
20111 of 122 subjects completed all survey elements. 60 of 67 subjects in Condition 1 and 51 of 55
subjects in Condition 2 provided complete survey responses. Non-response is unrelated to condition
as Condition 1 accounts for 54-55 percent of the data in both the respondent and full samples.
21Numeracy is measured with a six question exam related to simple math skills such as division
and compound interest previously validated in a number of large and representative samples (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2007; Banks and Oldfield, 2007; Gerardi, Goette and Meier, 2010). Cognitive ability
is measured with the three question Cognitive Reflection Test introduced and validated in Frederick
(2005). Subjective risk attitudes are measured on a 7 point scale with the question,“How willing are
you to take risks in general on a scale from 1 (unwilling) to 7 (fullly prepared)” previously validated
in a large representative sample (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner, 2005).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Balancing Test
Total Condition 1 Condition 2
N = 122 N = 67 N = 55
Variable # Obs Mean Mean Mean t-statistic p-value
(s.d) (s.d) (s.d.)
Male (=1) 119 0.46 0.42 0.52 1.12 (p=0.27)
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Academic Year 122 2.63 2.45 2.85 2.10 (p=0.04)
(1.08) (1.05) (1.08)
Grade Point Average 120 3.20 3.25 3.15 -1.26 (p=0.21)
(.42) (.44) (.39)
English 1st Language (=1) 122 0.56 0.51 0.62 1.22 (p=0.22)
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Smoker (=1) 122 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.68 (p=0.50)
(0.20) (0.17) (0.23)
Weekly Spending ($) 122 89.68 85.00 95.38 0.64 (p=0.53)
(89.49) (68.63) (110.12)
Risk Attitudes (1-7) 122 3.84 3.70 4.00 1.39 (p=0.17)
(1.19) (1.22) (1.14)
Cognitive Ability Score (1-3) 117 1.79 1.86 1.70 -0.83 (p=0.41)
(1.05) (1.08) (1.01)
Numeracy Score (1-6) 120 5.75 5.78 5.71 -0.76 (p=0.45)
(0.54) (0.52) (0.57)
Omnibus χ2 = 14.1, (p = 0.12)
Notes: Summary statistics for 122 subjects with unique switch points in all 22 decision tasks. # Obs
refers to the number of responses to each question. Omnibus χ2 test statistic corresponding to the null
hypothesis of zero slopes in logit regression with 111 subjects with complete survey data of condition
assignment on all survey variables with robust standard errors.
example, a decision is coded as risk neutral if the risk neutral response lies in the
interval generated by the subject’s switch point. Figure 5, Panel A presents these
classifications. Whereas the distributions of risk averse, neutral and loving responses
are somewhat even in the certainty equivalents of Condition 2, the majority of responses
are risk averse in the probability equivalents of Condition 1. Proportionately nearly
twice as many responses are classified as risk averse in probability equivalents relative
to certainty equivalents. As this may be a strict classification of responses, Figure 5,
Panel B extends the interval of the switch point to +/− one choice. By this wider
interval measure the majority of the data in Condition 1 remains risk averse, while the
majority of the data in Condition 2 is now classified as risk neutral.
Table 3 presents ordered logit regressions for the classification of responses of Figure
5, Panel A with standard errors clustered on the individual level. The dependent
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Figure 4: Conditions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2 Responses
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Note: Median data from 122 experimental subjects with unique switching points in
all 22 decision tasks. Dashed black line corresponds to risk neutrality. Solid red line
for Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 corresponds to KR model fit with λ̂ = 3.4. The KR model
predicts risk aversion for probability equivalents in Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 and risk
neutrality for certainty equivalents in Conditions 2.1 and 2.2.
variable is Risk Attitude, which takes the value -1 for a risk loving classification, 0 for
risk neutrality, and +1 for a risk averse response. The natural order of Risk Attitude
corresponds to increasing risk aversion. These regressions control for condition and
the variable Risk Neutral Response. Risk Neutral Response is coded from 0 to 100 and
expresses in percentage terms the dashed line of risk neutrality in Figure 4. That is, Risk
Neutral Response is either the given certain amount’s risk neutral probability equivalent
(in Condition 1), or the given gamble’s expected value divided by 30 (in Condition 2).
This helps to control for experimental variation that might be related to elicited risk
attitudes under non-EU preference models such as non-linear probability weighting.
Certain specifications additionally control for order and representation effects as well as
the collected demographic and attitudinal characteristics for individuals who responded
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Figure 5: Conditions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2 Classifications
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Note: The figure presents classifications of responses from 122 experimental subjects
with unique switching points in all 22 decision tasks. The KR model predicts risk
aversion for probability equivalents in Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 and risk neutrality for
certainty equivalents in Conditions 2.1 and 2.2. Panel A provides the classifications
based on the interval of a subject’s switch point. Panel B provides classifications based
on a wider interval of the switch point +/− one choice.
22
in full to the post-study survey. Across specifications, subjects in Condition 1 are
significantly more likely to have risk averse responses. Odds ratios for being classified
as risk averse relative to risk neutral or risk loving are provided in brackets. Subjects
randomly assigned to Condition 1 are between three and four times more likely to
exhibit risk aversion than those assigned to Condition 2.22
These simple tests indicate an endowment effect for risk. In certainty equivalents
tasks, subjects are generally risk neutral. In probability equivalents tasks, subjects are
generally risk averse. Standard expected utility, prospect theory and disappointment
aversion all predict experimental equivalence across these two environments. The data
are potentially consistent with the KR model, with its possibility of a stochastic ref-
erence distribution. However, the obtained data are not directly consistent with the
refined PPE concept, which would also predict identical behavior across conditions.
In applying the equilibrium concepts from KR, I consider some form of narrow
bracketing within a given row of a choice task. That is, the subject considers a
choice in a given row between Option A, representing some fixed amount or gam-
ble, G, and Option B, representing some fixed amount or gamble, F . As discussed
in Section 2.1.3, choosing Option A over Option B therefore implies the PPE rela-
tion U(G|G) > U(F |F ). However in the KR model there is some ambiguity in the
bracketing of the referent. It is possible, for instance, to consider the referent to be
the distribution induced by all choices in the task, or even all choices in the entire
experiment. Such a specification could potentially revive PPE as a viable organization
of the data. However solving for a PPE in these cases is computationally intensive and
a somewhat implausible calculation on the part of subjects. The narrow bracketing
used in this analysis is a direct application of the KR equilibrium in choices between
lotteries.
Equilibrium behavior even in its simplest form may be a stringent requirement for
experimental subjects. A body of evidence from strategic environments argues against
equilibrium logic in the laboratory (Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes and Craw-
ford, 2006; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007; Costa-Gomes et al., 2009). Resulting process
models such as level-k thinking are argued to be organized around initial reactions to
experimental environments. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) provide a similar indication,
suggesting that referents are established as probabilistic beliefs held at the moment an
individual first focused on a decision. In our environment, subjects may first focus their
thinking on the fixed element in a given series of decisions. If so, then the referent may
22Results are maintained with the inclusion of multiple switchers. Additionally, no interactions for
order or representation effects were obtained. Appendix Table A1 provides these additional regressions.
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Table 3: Probability and Certainty Equivalent Risk Attitude Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Risk Attitude Classification
Probability Equivalents: Condition 1 (=1) 1.330*** 1.329*** 1.172***
(0.225) (0.224) (0.241)
[3.782] [3.778] [3.230]
Risk Neutral Response 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male (=1) -0.087
(0.236)
Academic Year -0.223*
(0.094)
Grade Point Average 0.275
(0.266)
English 1st Language (=1) -0.368
(0.248)
Smoker (=1) -0.323
(0.502)
Weekly Spending ($) 0.001
(0.001)
Risk Attitudes (1-7) -0.128
(0.107)
Cognitive Ability Score (1-3) -0.052
(0.110)
Numeracy Score (1-6) 0.014
(0.248)
Order 2 (=1) 0.074 -0.008
(0.214) (0.218)
Representation (=1) 0.023 0.063
(0.215) (0.218)
Constant 1 -0.517* -0.471 -0.959
(0.220) (0.270) (1.467)
Constant 2 0.993*** 1.040*** 0.559
(0.215) (0.252) (1.464)
# Observations 1708 1708 1554
# Clusters 122 122 111
Log-Likelihood -1609.620 -1609.275 -1443.404
Notes: Coefficients from ordered logit of Risk Attitude classification on control variables, measured
from probability and certainty equivalents of Conditions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2. Risk Attitude takes the
value -1 for risk loving, 0 for risk neutral, and +1 for risk averse. Standard errors clustered on the
individual level in parentheses. Odds ratios for Condition 1 in brackets, calculated as the exponentiated
coefficient. Column (3) features data from 111 subjects who also completed the post-study survey.
Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
sensibly change across the conditions of our experiment. In certainty equivalents the
referent will be stochastic, while in probability equivalents the referent will be certain.
See Section 5 for further discussion.
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4.2 Estimating KR Preferences
Under the assumption that subjects organize their thinking around the fixed element in
a series of decisions, the KR model with exogenously manipulated referents rationalizes
the data. Importantly, such a model is easily implemented econometrically. The KR
model motivated above is described by one key parameter, λ, the degree of loss aversion,
which can be estimated at either the group or individual level via non-linear least
squares.
Using the data from probability equivalent Conditions 1.1 and 1.2, the midpoint of
the interval implied by a subject’s switch point is taken as the value q∗ in equation (2).
Equation (2) is then estimated via non-linear least squares with standard errors clus-
tered on the subject level. The aggregate estimate is λ̂ = 3.41 (s.e. = 0.34). The null
hypothesis of zero loss aversion, λ = 1, is rejected F1,66 = 49.06, p < 0.01. This value
of loss aversion is consistent with loss aversion estimates from other contexts (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992; Gill and Prowse, 2010; Pope and Schweitzer, Forthcoming) and
is closely in line with the often discussed benchmark of losses being felt twice as severely
as gains, λ = 3, η = 1 (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007).23 Figure 4 presents predicted
values from this aggregate regression as the solid red line for Conditions 1.1 and 1.2.
The aggregate data matches well the fitted model’s predicted hump-shaped deviation
from risk neutrality. Of course, the KR preference model predicts risk neutrality in
Conditions 2.1 and 2.2.
In order to evaluate the predictive validity of the KR preference model, it can be
tested out of sample with alternative segments of the data. As noted above, the KR
preference model with a stochastic referent predicts risk neutrality in Condition 2.3
and predicts a particular shape of quadratically declining risk aversion in Condition
1.3. Figure 6 presents data from these conditions as well as out-of-sample predictions
for KR model with the estimated λ̂ = 3.4. Though the KR prediction of risk neutrality
breaks down at the intermediate probabilities of Condition 2.3, in Condition 1.3, the
out-of-sample prediction closely matches aggregate behavior.24
23The functional form of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) does not feature consumption utility and
so the loss aversion estimate of λ̂ = 2.25 in their paper is a direct measure of losses being felt twice
as severely as gains.
24Additionally, Condition 1.3 reproduces the general shape and level of the uncertainty equivalents
discussed in Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) demonstrating a slightly convex relationship between
given gambles and their uncertainty equivalents. However, Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) document
the convexity becoming sharper as the given gamble approaches certainty, and this result is not
present in the data. Minor differences in experimental detail may account for the difference at p = 0
between the present results and Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) including a different number and order
of tasks and slightly changed tasks. The Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) price lists were designed
with decision aids of checked top and bottom rows. The task used in Condition 1.3 was not. More
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Figure 6: Conditions 1.3 and 2.3
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Note: Median data from 122 experimental subjects with unique switching points in
all 22 decision tasks. Dashed black line corresponds to risk neutrality. Solid red
lines correspond to out-of-sample KR model prediction with λ̂ = 3.4 as estimated in
Conditions 1.1 and 1.2.
In addition to aggregate out-of-sample predictions, for the 67 subjects in Condition
1, individual analyses can be conducted. Using the data from Conditions 1.1 and 1.2,
the degree of loss aversion, λi, can be estimated following equation (2). These individual
estimates, λ̂i, can be correlated with behavior in Condition 1.3. As discussed in Section
3.1, the deviation from risk neutrality is predicted to increase with λi.
importantly, however, appears to be the presence of the physical representation of Option A. The
sharpened convexity at p = 0 in Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) is driven by individuals who violate
first order stochastic dominance close to certainty. They document individual dominance violation
rates between p = 0 and p = 0.05 of around 17.5 percent across three tasks. When Option A is not
physically represented, a similar violation rate of 13.5 percent is found. However, when Option A is
physically represented, zero violations of stochastic dominance at certainty are observed. The effect
of physical representation on the proportion of individuals violating stochastic dominance at certainty
is significant (z = 2.09, p < 0.05).
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The log deviation from risk neutrality, Log Deviation, is measured for each individ-
ual by taking the log difference between the area under the linear interpolation of their
responses to Condition 1.3 and the area under the dashed risk neutral response line.
Hence, Log Deviation would take the value 0 for risk neutrality, a positive value for risk
aversion and a negative value for risk loving. Figure 7, Panels A and B provide his-
tograms of the individual estimates of loss aversion λ̂i and Log Deviation. The median
λ̂i is 3.6, echoing the aggregate result. The median Log Deviation is 0.15, indicating
a deviation towards risk aversion in Condition 1.3. Figure 7, Panel C correlates loss
aversion, λ̂i, estimated from Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 with the Log Deviation calculated
from Condition 1.3.25 Individuals who are more loss averse in Conditions 1.1 and 1.2,
deviate more from risk neutrality in Condition 1.3. The correlation is significant at
all conventional levels (ρ = 0.48, p < 0.01). Additionally, individuals with estimated
λ̂i close to 1 have calculated Log Deviation close to the risk neutral level of 0. This
indicates both experimental consistency across conditions and the predictive validity
of loss aversion estimates at the individual level.
4.3 Secondary Study Within-Subjects Design
The results to here have been from a primary between-subjects design. Though the
data demonstrate a sizeable endowment effect for risk and the KR preference model
is able to organize the results, questions may naturally arise about the robustness of
the phenomenon to issues of selection. In this section, I discuss portions of the data
obtained for Andreoni and Sprenger (2010), a within-subjects study of 76 subjects
designed primarily with uncertainty equivalents similar to Condition 1.3 and certainty
equivalents similar to Condition 2.1.26 Two Holt and Laury (2002) risk tasks were
implemented as a buffer between uncertainty equivalents and certainty equivalents in
Andreoni and Sprenger (2010) and decisions were collected between conditions.
Importantly, the uncertainty equivalent for p = 0 is identical to a probability equiv-
alent. Subjects are asked to provide the gamble probability over $30 and $0 that makes
them indifferent to a 100% chance of receiving $10. This single probability equivalent
can be compared to the subject’s own range of certainty equivalents. One finds the
gamble probability over $30 and $0 at which the certainty equivalent is revealed to
be $10. Under the assumption that the referent is perceived as the fixed element in a
25Three subjects with extreme values, λ̂i > 20 or Log Deviation < −0.5, are not included in Figure
7, Panel C for space, though their data is used in analysis and presented correlations.
26Some minor experimental differences exist such as the use of pre-checked boxes as decision aids,
differing orders and no representation in Andreoni and Sprenger (2010). See Section 4.2 and Andreoni
and Sprenger (2010) for more details.
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Figure 7: Individual Loss Aversion (λ̂i) and Log Deviation From Risk Neutrality
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task, comparison of this gamble probability to the revealed probability equivalent of
$10 gives a within-subjects measure of the endowment effect for risk.
For certainty equivalents tasks, the probability of winning $30 that yields a cer-
tainty equivalent of $10 is identified by finding the smallest probability, p, at which
the certainty equivalent is higher than $10, the largest probability, p′, at which the
certainty equivalent is smaller than $10, and taking the average p = (p+ p′)/2.27 The
average value of p is 0.306 (s.d. 0.210). The average (q; 30, 0) probability equivalent
of $10 for sure is 0.541 (0.220). The difference is significant at all conventional levels
(t = 7.16, p < 0.001).28 Additionally, these values are remarkably consistent with the
between-subjects evidence documented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 where subjects are close
to risk neutral in certainty equivalents and reveal average probability equivalents for
$10 with certainty of 0.547 (0.189) in Condition 1.3 and 0.546 (0.185) in Condition 1.1.
The within-subjects results demonstrate an endowment effect for risk. Subjects are
close to risk neutral when revealing the gamble for which the certainty equivalent is $10.
The same subjects are risk averse when revealing the probability equivalent gamble for
$10. The KR model with the standard values of λ = 3, η = 1 and the assumption
that the referent is perceived as the fixed element of a task would predict $10 certainty
equivalents to arise at a 33% chance of winning $30 and probability equivalents of $10
for sure to arise at a 50% chance of winning $30. The within-subjects data are therefore
consistent with the KR preference model with standard values and those obtained in
the between-subjects estimates of Section 4.2.
5 Discussion
The obtained results are supportive of the KR preference model. Unlike prior work
demonstrating the importance of expectations for reference points, these results are
able to distinguish between KR preferences and other expectations-based models such
as disappointment aversion. Gaining separation between these models is an important
experimental step and necessary for evaluating theoretical developments that depend
critically on the stochasticity of the referent (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007; Heidhues
and Koszegi, 2008; Koszegi and Rabin, 2009). Additionally, the distinction between
the KR and DA models is important in a variety of applied settings where the two
27There are 13 cases where p′ is not observed because the individuals’ certainty equivalents always
exceeded $10. There is one case where p is not observed because the individual’s certainty equivalent
never exceeded $10. In these cases the non-missing value is used. Eliminating these observations does
not influence the result.
28The difference remains significant when comparing (q; 30, 0) to either p (t = 4.32, p < 0.001), or
p′ (t = 8.57, p < 0.001) for individuals with non-missing values of p and p′, respectively.
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models make different predictions. In particular, the DA model predicts first order
risk aversion in the sense of Segal and Spivak (1990) over all gambles, while the KR
model predicts first order risk aversion only when risk is unexpected. When outcomes
lie within the support of expectations, risk neutrality is predicted. Several applications
in finance, insurance purchasing and decision science can be considered.
First, in finance first-order risk aversion is argued to influence stock market partic-
ipation (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Barberis et al., 2006) and returns (Epstein and
Zin, 1990; Barberis and Huang, 2001). The KR model indicates that individuals will
accept fair bets within expectations, but grow more risk averse as outcomes exceed
expectations. As such, the KR model would predict first-order risk aversion, with cor-
responding participation and returns effects, only when potential outcomes lie outside
prior expectations. In contrast, under the DA model individuals are first-order risk
averse over all gambles, never accepting a fair investment bet.29
Second, a comparison can be made for insurance purchasing where first order risk
aversion potentially influences contract choice (Sydnor, Forthcoming). First-order risk
aversion predicts a desire for full insurance even when insurance is not actuarially fair
(Segal and Spivak, 1990). Hence, a disappointment averse consumer may fully insure
under positive insurance profits. The KR model predicts insurance only for potential
outcomes outside of expectations. As such, the KR model gives a suggestion as to
what gambles will be insured and how they relate to expectations.30 This is in contrast
to disappointment aversion where full insurance is desired for all gambles. Future
work should explore these different predictions of the KR and DA models in real-world
financial decision-making and experimental settings.
Third, a gap between KR and DA models is apparent in decision science where
researchers have long debated the inconsistency between probability equivalent and
certainty equivalent methods for utility assessment (Hershey et al., 1982; McCord and
de Neufville, 1985, 1986; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985; Schoemaker, 1990). The
general finding is that probability equivalents yield more risk aversion. This difference
in elicited utility is predicted by the KR model but not DA. Though there are some hints
in the literature that such experimental inconsistency may be due to a “response mode
29Additionally, there is no natural way to model an outcome being outside of expectations in
disappointment aversion. All gambles are evaluated relative to their own expected utility certainty
equivalents.
30Of course, risks can lie outside of expectations by endogenously constructing a fixed referent and
risks can coincide with expectations by constructing a stochastic referent. It may be UPE to insure
and have a fixed referent as well as not insure and have a stochastic referent. Hence the necessity of
the PPE concept to select among such UPE choices. Koszegi and Rabin (2007) provide a detailed
discussion of the relationship between insurance purchasing and expectations under the KR preference
model.
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bias,” where probability equivalent tasks are reframed as mixed gambles with gains and
losses (Hershey et al., 1982; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985), many other explanations
for the inconsistency have been proposed (McCord and de Neufville, 1985; Schoemaker
and Hershey, 1992; Schoemaker, 1993). The present results and use of the KR model
help to resolve this long-standing issue. If referents are changed from stochastic to
certain as the environment moves from a certainty to a probability equivalent, then
the specific KR structure of preferences and not some idiosyncratic bias organizes this
long-debated inconsistency in utility elicitiation.
Though the findings are supportive of the KR model and provide direction for fur-
ther analysis, a distinction must be made between the results presented and the equilib-
rium predictions of the KR model. Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) present a rational
expectations equilibrium concept, the Unacclimating Personal Equilibrium (UPE), in
which consumption outcomes correspond to expectations. To select among the po-
tential multiplicity of equilibria, the Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) concept is
introduced. The Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) concept of KR requires the
coincidence of expectations and behavior. Under the PPE refinement, the KR model,
similar to disappointment aversion, predicts no endowment effect for risk. Because the
data reject disappointment aversion, they necessarily reject the PPE refinement.
PPE logic may be a stringent requirement for experimental subjects. Koszegi and
Rabin (2006) suggest that “a person’s reference point is her probabilistic beliefs about
the relevant consumption outcome held between the time she first focused on the deci-
sion determining the outcome and shortly before consumption occurs”[p. 1141]. “First
focus” in the present studies is plausibly drawn to the fixed element in a given series
of decisions. Hence the referent may be established as this fixed element and deviated
from when alternatives become sufficiently attractive. It is likely that the different
fixed elements induced different stochastic referents as the the data are systematically
organized by the KR model under this assumption.
The non-PPE finding is in line with a body of evidence from strategic environ-
ments arguing against equilibrium logic and organizing behavior with initial reactions
to decision environments (Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006;
Crawford and Iriberri, 2007; Costa-Gomes et al., 2009). Additionally it suggests that
expectations-based referents may be quickly changed by context. This supports field
findings such as Pope and Schweitzer (Forthcoming) and Post et al. (2008) where ref-
erents and risk taking behavior change with both minor contextual shifts such as field
performance on specific holes in golf tournaments and major contextual variables such
as unwon large-value prizes in sequential game shows.
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The potential sensitivity of expectations-based referents to contextual changes has
implications for both economic agents and experimental methodology. First, from a
methodological perspective, if fixed elements can serve as referents, slightly changed
choice environments may induce very different behavior. This is of particular impor-
tance for the experimental measurement of preferences and willingness to pay where
similar techniques are used and resulting estimates are given economic significance.
Second, if expectations-based referents can be manipulated via simple framing devices
without physical endowments, then scope exists for marketers and policy-makers to
deeply influence behavior with menus alone.
6 Conclusion
Reference-dependent preferences with loss-aversion relative to a reference point has
been widely adopted in both theoretical and empirical research, rationalizing not only
endowment effect behavior but a host of other anomalies from labor supply, to consumer
behavior, to finance. Critical to such reference-dependent models is the determination
of the referent around which losses and gains are encoded. Though initially the refer-
ent was left a virtual free parameter, extensions to reference dependence have added
discipline. Attention has focused on expectations-based mechanisms for the determina-
tion of fixed reference points in models of Disappointment Aversion (DA) (Bell, 1985;
Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Gul, 1991), or for the determination of stochastic reference
distributions in the models of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) (KR).
A body of field and laboratory evidence has highlighted the importance of expecta-
tions for reference-dependent behavior consistent with these expectation-based models.
Though accumulated data does demonstrate the importance of expectations for refer-
ence dependence, the data is generally consistent with either the DA or the KR model.
That is, prior evidence cannot distinguish between the two models.
This paper presents evidence from two experiments focused on identifying a par-
ticular prediction of the KR model which is not shared with DA: an endowment effect
for risk. The endowment effect for risk is closely related to the potential stochasticity
of the referent. When the referent is stochastic, and an individual is offered a cer-
tain amount, the KR model predicts risk neutrality. Conversely, when the referent is a
fixed certain amount, and an individual is offered a gamble, the KR model predicts risk
aversion. Disappointment aversion makes no such prediction of differential behavior as
gambles are always evaluated relative to a fixed referent, the gamble’s expected utility
certainty equivalent.
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To date, little evidence exists exploring the KR implication of an endowment effect
for risk. In purposefully simple risk preference experiments, eliminating often-discussed
confounds, I test both between- and within-subjects for an endowment effect for risky
gambles. In the primary study discussed, half of subjects make probability equiv-
alent choices between fixed certain amounts and changing gambles. Half of subjects
make certainty equivalent choices between fixed gambles and changing certain amounts.
Importantly, both standard models and most reference-dependent models including
disappointment aversion predict equivalence of risk attitudes across the experimental
conditions. One exception is the KR preference model. Under the assumption that
the fixed element in a series of decisions serves as the referent, the KR model predicts
that subjects will be risk averse in probability equivalents and risk neutral in certainty
equivalents.
Both between- and within-subjects the data indicate an endowment effect for risk.
In the primary study, subjects are between three and four times more likely to be
risk averse if randomly faced with a probability equivalent as opposed to a certainty
equivalent. In a secondary, within-subjects study, the phenomenon is also observed.
Under the assumption that the experimental variation changes the perceived referent,
the KR preference model organizes the data at both the aggregate and individual level
and both between and within-subjects.
Finding evidence of an endowment effect for risk, particularly in a neutral en-
vironment, provides critical support for the KR preference model. Unlike prior work
demonstrating the importance of expectations for reference points, these results clearly
distinguish between KR preferences and disappointment aversion. Providing separation
between these competing accounts of expectations-based reference dependence repre-
sents an important experimental step and a necessary contribution for evaluating theory
models and applications that rely specifically on stochastic referents. Demonstrating
methodology for distinguishing between the expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences is additionally important as the different models provide notably differ-
ent accounts of financial decision-making, insurance purchasing behavior, and long-
standing anomalies in decision science. Future work should test these competing ac-
counts, particularly in the domain of financial behavior, with both field and laboratory
evidence.
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A Appendix: Not For Publication
A.1 KR Preferences and Uncertainty Equivalents
I demonstrate two results: 1) that the KR preference models predicts quadratically
declining risk aversion in uncertainty equivalents where individuals are endowed with
gambles (p; y, x), y > x > 0 and trading for gambles (q; y, 0); and 2) that the KR
preference model predicts risk neutrality in inverted uncertainty equivalents where
individuals are endowed with gambles (p; y, 0) and trading for gambles (q; y, x).
A.1.1 Uncertainty Equivalents
Uncertainty equivalents feature a binary referent gamble, G, summarized by the prob-
ability p. Let r1 be the referent with probability p and r2 < r1 be the referent with
probability 1− p. Given the linear KR model, the utility of the referent is
U(G|G) = p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 + p · (1− p) · [1 · (r1 − r2) + λ · (r2 − r1)].
Now, I consider a binary consumption gamble, F , summarized by the probability q.
Let x1 = r1 be the gamble outcome with probability q and x2 < r2 be the gamble
outcome with probability 1− q. I write the KR utility as
U(F |G) = q·p·x1+(1−q)·p·[x2+λ·(x2−r1)]+q·(1−p)·[x1+1·(x1−r2)]+(1−q)·(1−p)·[x2+λ·(x2−r2)].
For simplicity I carry out the uncertainty equivalent replacements, x1 = r1 and x2 = 0
such that this reduces to
U(F |G) = q · {r1 + (1− p) · [r1− r2] + p ·λ · r1 + (1− p) ·λ · r2}−λ · p · r1−λ · (1− p) · r2.
The uncertainty equivalent will be the consumption gamble, F ∗, with corresponding
probability q∗ satisfying U(F ∗|G) = U(G|G).
p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 + p · (1− p) · [1 · (r1 − r2) + λ · (r2 − r1)] =
q∗ · {r1 + (1− p) · [r1 − r2] + p · λ · r1 + (1− p) · λ · r2} − λ · p · r1 − λ · (1− p) · r2
q∗ =
(1 + λ) · p · r1 + (1 + λ) · (1− p) · r2 + (1− λ) · p · (1− p) · (r1 − r2)
{r1 + (1− p) · [r1 − r2] + p · λ · r1 + (1− p) · λ · r2}
(3)
The uncertainty equivalent q∗ can be evaluated at two critical points, p = 0 and p = 1.
At p = 0,
q∗0 =
(1 + λ) · r2
2r1 + (λ− 1) · r2
.
This is simply the probability equivalent for r2 with certainty when x2 = 0. To see
this, I compare to the probability equivalent of equation (2) with r = r2, x2 = 0, and
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x1 = r1,
q∗ =
r − x2 − λ · (x2 − r)
[x1 − x2] + [1 · (x1 − r)− λ · (x2 − r)]
,
q∗ = q∗0 =
(1 + λ) · r2
2r1 + (λ− 1) · r2
.
As in the development of 2.1.1, I predict risk aversion for loss averse individuals, λ > 1,
at p = 0.
At intermediate probabilities, the uncertainty equivalent follows equation (3) above
which depends upon the squared probability term p · (1−p). The function q∗(p) can be
traced to demonstrate quadratically declining risk aversion. One such trace is provided
as the out of sample prediction in Figure 4. Risk neutrality is slowly approached such
that at p = 1, q∗ = 1. I evaluate q∗ at p = 1, and show
q∗1 =
(1 + λ) · r1
(1 + λ) · r1
= 1.
A.1.2 Inverted Uncertainty Equivalents
Inverted uncertainty equivalents, like uncertainty equivalents feature a binary referent
gamble, G, summarized by the probability p. Let r1 be the referent with probability
p and r2 < r1 be the referent with probability 1 − p. Given the linear KR model, the
utility of the referent is
U(G|G) = p · r1 + (1− p) · r2 + p · (1− p) · [1 · (r1 − r2) + λ · (r2 − r1)].
For simplicity I carry out the inverted uncertainty equivalent replacement, r2 = 0 such
that this reduces to
U(G|G) = p · r1 + p · (1− p) · (1− λ) · r1,
U(G|G) = p · r1 · [1 + (1− p) · (1− λ)],
U(G|G) = p · r1 · [2 + p · λ− p− λ].
It will be convenient to write this as
U(G|G) = p · r1 · [2 + p · λ− p]− p · λ · r1.
Now, I consider a binary consumption gamble, F , summarized by the probability
q. Let x1 = r1 be the gamble outcome with probability q and x2 > r2 be the gamble
outcome with probability 1− q. I write the KR utility as
U(F |G) = q·p·x1+(1−q)·p·[x2+λ·(x2−r1)]+q·(1−p)·[x1+1·(x1−r2)]+(1−q)·(1−p)·[x2+1·(x2−r2)]
and note that only one term features loss aversion λ as x2 > r2. I carry out the
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replacements r2 = 0 and x1 = r1 such that this reduces to
U(F |G) = q ·p · r1 + (1− q) ·p · [x2 +λ · (x2− r1)] + q · (1−p) · 2r1 + (1− q) · (1−p) · 2x2,
U(F |G) = [q · r1 + (1− q) · x2] · [2 + p · λ− p]− p · λ · r1.
The inverted uncertainty equivalent will be the consumption gamble, F ∗, with corre-
sponding probability q∗ satisfying U(F ∗|G) = U(G|G),
p · r1 · [2 + p · λ− p]− p · λ · r1 = [q∗ · r1 + (1− q∗) · x2] · [2 + p · λ− p]− p · λ · r1;
p · r1 = q∗ · r1 + (1− q∗) · x2.
Note that the left hand side corresponds to the expected value of the referent gamble
with r2 = 0. The right hand side corresponds to the expected value of the consumption
gamble with x1 = r1. The inverted uncertainty equivalent reveals where the gamble
expected values are equal and so, independent of loss aversion, λ, risk neutrality is
expected.
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A.2 Appendix Tables
Table A1: Additional Risk Attitude Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Risk Attitude Classification
Panel A: Including Multiple Switchers
Condition 1 (=1) 1.303*** 1.304*** 1.128***
(0.206) (0.207) (0.223)
Risk Neutral Response Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes
Order and Representation No Yes Yes
# Observations 1904 1904 1750
# Clusters 136 136 125
Panel B: All Treatment Interactions
Condition 1 (=1) 1.330*** 1.784*** 1.450**
(0.225) (0.409) (0.540)
Condition 1 (=1) x Order 2 (=0) x Rep (=1) -0.402 -0.153
(0.613) (0.684)
Condition 1 (=1) x Order 2 (=1) x Rep (=0) -0.709 -0.200
(0.584) (0.746)
Condition 1 (=1) x Order 2 (=1) x Rep (=1) -0.738 -0.634
(0.593) (0.686)
Condition 1 (=0) x Order 2 (=0) x Rep (=1) 0.050 -0.114
(0.377) (0.394)
Condition 1 (=0) x Order 2 (=1) x Rep (=0) 0.271 -0.178
(0.351) (0.435)
Condition 1 (=0) x Order 2 (=1) x Rep (=1) 0.443 0.326
(0.287) (0.321)
Condition 1 (=0) - - -
Risk Neutral Response Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes
# Observations 1708 1708 1554
# Clusters 122 122 111
Notes: Coefficients from ordered logit of Risk Attitude classification on control variables,
measured from probability and certainty equivalents of Conditions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2.
Risk Attitude takes the value -1 for risk loving, 0 for risk neutral, and +1 for risk averse.
Standard errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Demographics, Order and
Representation correspond to variables in Table 3.
Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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A.3 Experimental Materials
A.3.1 Instructions
Hello and Welcome.
ELIGIBILITY FOR THIS STUDY: To be in this
study, you must be a UCSD student. There are no other re-
quirements. The study will be completely anonymous. We will
not collect your name, student PID or any other identifying in-
formation. You have been assigned a participant number and it
is on the note card in front of you. This number will be used
throughout the study. Please inform us if you do not know or
cannot read your participant number.
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EARNING MONEY: To begin, you will be given a $5 minimum payment.
This $5 is yours. Whatever you earn from the study today will be added to this minimum
payment. All payments will be made in cash at the end of the study today.
In this study you will make decisions between two options. The first option will always be
called OPTION A. The second option will always be called OPTION B. Each decision you
make is a choice. For each decision, all you have to do is decide whether you prefer OPTION
A or OPTION B.
These decisions will be made in 3 separate blocks of tasks. Each block of tasks is slightly
different, and so new instructions will be read at the beginning of each task block.
Once all of the decision tasks have been completed, we will randomly select one decision
as the decision-that-counts. Each decision has an equal chance of being the decision-that-
counts. If you preferred OPTION A, then OPTION A would be implemented. If you preferred
OPTION B, then OPTION B would be implemented.
Throughout the tasks, either OPTION A, OPTION B or both will involve chance. You
will be fully informed of the chance involved for every decision. Once we know which is
the decision-that-counts, and whether you prefer OPTION A or OPTION B, we will then
determine the value of your payments.
For example, OPTION A could be a 75 in 100 chance of receiving $10 and a 25 in 100
chance of receiving $30. This might be compared to OPTION B of a 50 in 100 chance of
receiving $30 and a 50 in 100 chance of receiving nothing. Imagine for a moment which one
you would prefer. You have been provided with a calculator should you like to use it in
making your decisions.
If this was chosen as the decision-that-counts, and you preferred OPTION A, we would
then randomly choose a number from 1 to 100. This would be done by throwing two ten-
sided die: one for the tens digit and one for the ones digit (0-0 will be 100). If the chosen
number was between 1 and 75 (inclusive) you would receive $10 (+5 minimum payment) =
$15. If the number was between 76 and 100 (inclusive) you would receive $30 (+5 minimum
payment) = $35. If, instead, you preferred OPTION B, we would again randomly choose a
number from 1 to 100. If the chosen number was between 1 and 50 (inclusive) you’d receive
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$0 (+5 minimum payment) = $5. If the number was between 51 and 100 (inclusive) you’d
receive $30 (+5 minimum payment) = $35.
In a moment we will begin the first task.
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